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J.B. v. M.B.: New Evidence That Contracts Need to Be
Reevaluated As the Method of Choice for Resolving Frozen
Embryo Disputes
J.B. and M.B. were married.' The couple discovered early in the
marriage the difficult fact that J.B.'s endometriosis and resultant
blockage of one of her fallopian tubes would prevent her from
becoming pregnant.2 Refusing to abandon their efforts toward a
much-wanted pregnancy, the couple contracted with a fertility clinic
to attempt in vitro fertilization ("IVF"). 3 This procedure is one of
science's most notable miracle-working technologies. A woman is
hormonally stimulated to produce multiple egg cells that are then
extracted from her body and combined in a petri dish with a man's
sperm.' Successful fertilization results in embryos. 5 Good quality
embryos are either returned to the woman's body for implantation6 or
1. J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 613, 615 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000), affd in part and
modified in part,783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
2. Id. No infertility problems were attributable to M.B. Id.
3. Id.
4. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 709 (N.J. 2001); see GODWIN I. MENIRU, CAMBRIDGE
GUIDE TO INFERTILITY MANAGEMENT AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 110 (2001).
5. See STEPHEN R. BAYER ET AL., THE BOSTON IVF HANDBOOK OF INFERTILITY:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS WHO CARE FOR INFERTILE COUPLES 80
(2002). The J.B. court uses the term "preembryo," defined as "a medically accurate, if
awkward, term for a zygote, or fertilized egg, that has not been implanted in a uterus; the
embryo proper develops only after implantation."
J.B., 751 A.2d at 614 n.1.
"Preembryo," however, does not appear to be a scientific term. It is, rather, a popular
term commonly used to refer to the embryo from the first to the fourteenth days of
development, before the embryonic axis appears.
Glossary, in THE ETHICS OF
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 347, 348 (Kenneth D. Alpern ed., 1992). Furthermore,
"preembryo" has been criticized as a politically loaded term that is used to reduce an
embryo's human character.
See Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and
Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes,
84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 55 n.1 (1999) (citing Richard A. McCormick, Who or What Is the
Preembryo?, KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 1, 1 (1991)). Because the stage of development of
the embryo is not relevant to the procreational autonomy analysis, this Recent
Development uses the term "embryo," which refers to a zygote at any stage of
development prior to becoming a fetus. See Glossary, supra, at 348.
6. BAYER ET AL., supra note 5 (At the embryo transfer stage, "good quality embryos
are usually between 6-10 cells in development."). Although ovarian stimulation for IVF
treatment aims to retrieve many oocytes to increase the chances of conception, MENIRU,
supra note 4, at 123, the number of embryos that may be implanted at once is limited by
the risk of multiple pregnancies that would have to be selectively terminated to protect the
health of the pregnant mother and developing fetuses. Id. at 136-37 & tbl.8.6 (providing a
table listing potential consequences of multiple pregnancy); see Coleman, supra note 5, at
60 n.19.
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stored at -196' C for possible future use. 7 The IVF procedure proved
successful for J.B. and M.B. and yielded a healthy baby girl four years
after their wedding date.8
Despite the romantic veneer suggested by the initial facts of this
couple's story, undisclosed problems stirred within the marital
relationship and caused the couple to separate only six months after
their daughter's birth.' Separation led to divorce."0 Although most

matters surrounding the divorce were decided by a property
settlement, one major question was left unresolved between the
couple: who was to get custody of the frozen embryos?11
Society demands an answer to this question. More and more
married couples are employing IVF procedures in their efforts to

conceive.12

Advances in reproductive technology are making the

7. The process of freezing embryos for potential future use is termed
"cryopreservation." Glossary, supra note 5, at 347. Cryopreservation has several
advantages. See generally MENIRU, supra note 4, at 232 (explaining how the availability of
cryopreservation technology has expanded the scope of infertility treatment and made
such treatment more convenient). Cryopreservation helps ensure that the woman will not
have to endure the hormonal injections, bodily changes, and cell extraction procedure
more than once. See Coleman, supra note 5, at 60. This benefit is significant because, for
a large proportion of couples, conception through IVF requires multiple attempts. See
MENIRU, supra note 4, at 142. For a detailed description of the various hormonal and
other regimens that women must endure for conventional IVF treatments, see generally
id. at 118-30, 134-35 (outlining the various physical procedures the woman must endure
up until the point of the egg cell extraction, including injections of powerful hormones,
ultrasound scans, blood tests, and ultimately a surgical procedure by which egg cells are
aspirated from both ovaries through a needle that pierces the vaginal wall and punctures
ovarian follicles where they are located). Cryopreservation eliminates these additional
physical burdens attributable to IVF and thereby reduces the time and financial cost
necessary to promote pregnancy. Coleman, supra note 5, at 60-61. Even more
consequential, cryopreservation allows individuals to have genetically related children
after they become infertile. See id. at 61. Although Professor Coleman describes this
benefit only with respect to women's infertility, id., cryopreservation gives assistance to
infertile males as well. For example, IVF can be combined with intracytoplasmic sperm
injection ("ICSI") technology, in which each egg cell is injected with a single sperm cell to
offer patients with extremely severe sperm defects a success rate similar to that obtained
with standard IVF using healthy semen. Gordon Baker et al., Assessment of the Male and
Preparationof Sperm for ARTs, in HANDBOOK OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 99, 100
(Alan 0. Trounson & David K. Gardner eds., 2d ed. 2000).
8. J.B., 783 A.2d at 710.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 711. Seven embryos remained in storage. Id. at 708.
12. More than 100,000 frozen embryos are currently being stored in IVF clinics across
the United States. Susan B. Apel, Disposition of Frozen Embryos: Are Contracts the
Solution?, 27 VT. B. J. 29, 29 (2001). This number is growing at a rate of 18.8% per year.
Id. Furthermore, research is demonstrating that the viability of frozen embryos is longer
than the two year period estimated twenty years ago. Id. Today scientists believe that
frozen embryos can remain viable for at least ten years. Id.
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procedure more effective and less costly to infertile couples. 3
Furthermore, the current ten to fourteen percent infertility rate
among Americans" is expected to rise as more women marry later in
life and decide to forego having children during their most fertile
years. 5 These factors combined with the astonishing fifty percent
divorce rate foreshadow that the United States is bound to experience
increasing amounts of litigation over the custody of frozen embryos. 6
Dispositional contracts occupy center stage in these custody
debates. 7 For instance, J.B. and M.B. entered into a contract with
the Cooper Center for In Vitro Fertilization, P.C., at the time of the
IVF procedure. 8 J.B. alleged that a term within the contract

13. See MENIRu, supra note 4, at 117 (stating that IVF is proving more efficient and
cost effective than some traditional medical remedies, such as tubal surgery, in certain
classes of patients).
14. See BAYER ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-2 (citing a recent survey in which 10.5% of
women in the reproductive age group were infertile); Paul W. Zarutskie, Evaluation of the
Infertile Couple, in OFFICE GYNECOLOGY 488, 488 (Morton A. Stenchever ed., 2d ed.
1996) (stating that although most studies focus only on female infertility, a more realistic
estimate of infertility is that approximately 13.9% of couples who desire children have a
problem with conception); see also Esther M. Schonfeld, Note, "To Be or Not to Be a
Parent?" The Search for a Solution to Custody Disputes Over Frozen Embryos, 15 TOURO
L. REV. 305, 308 (1998) (stating that more than one in eight married couples in the United
States are infertile).
15. See Zarutskie, supra note 14, at 489; Apel, supra note 12, at 29 (stating that the
time it takes to attempt pregnancy, determine infertility, seek counseling, and finally
undergo IVF procedures also contributes to delays in childbearing). As an alternative to
the cryopreservation of embryos, a woman in these situations may seek to cryopreserve
her own unfertilized egg cells. Ideally, this technique would preserve her individual ability
to have genetically related children in the future, yet avoid social, moral, and legal
complications that may arise from her male partner's ties to their frozen embryos if he and
she separate. Jillian M. Shaw et al., Cryopreservation of Oocytes and Embryos, in
HANDBOOK OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, supra note 7, at 373, 374. Unfortunately, this

alternative is not practically feasible. Oocyte freezing is rarely performed because of the
very poor prospects of achieving a pregnancy with frozen oocytes. Id. at 374.
16. Shaw, supra note 15, at 374.
17. In all four cases reaching states' high courts that have decided the fate of frozen
embryos after a couple's divorce, the existence and enforceability of dispositional
contracts were pivotal factors. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057-59 (Mass. 2000)
(upholding an injunction prohibiting former wife from using embryos on the basis that
former husband's and wife's dispositional contract was unenforceable); J.B. v. M.B., 783
A.2d 707, 714-17 (N.J.'2001) (resorting to balancing husband's and wife's interests in
control of embryos where parties' dispositional contract was unenforceable); Kass v. Kass,
696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998) (enforcing the parties' agreement to donate their prezygotes for research); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tenn. 1992) (stating that if the
parties had executed a written agreement specifying what disposition should be made of
any unused embryos, that factor might have influenced or controlled the result of the
parties' litigation).
18. J.B., 783 A.2d at 710.
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expressly provided for the disposition of the embryos in the event of
divorce: 9
I, [J.B.] (patient), and [M.B.] (partner), agree that all
control, direction, and ownership of our tissues will be
relinquished to the IVF Program under the following
circumstances:
1. A dissolution of our marriage by court order, unless
the court specifies who takes control and direction of
the tissues .... 20
Will this or any other dispositional contract be enforced by the courts
as between spouses like J.B. and M.B.? The New Jersey Supreme
Court is the most recent of only a handful of state courts that have
provided any guidance as to the answer to this question.2 1 The courts
have consistently examined these cases of first impression against the
same public policy backdrop, yet they have reached entirely different
conclusions. 2 Specifically, all four courts reaching the issue have
emphasized the need to protect procreationalautonomy,2 3 the right of
individuals to be left alone with respect to their decisions to procreate
or bear children. Two of the four courts found contracts to be the
answer, 24 while the most recent two courts to decide the question,

19. In a certification filed with a motion for summary judgment on the embryo issue,
J.B. alleged that she and M.B. decided to attempt conception using the IVF procedure
during a time when they were married and intended to remain married. Id. She
emphasized that she endured the IVF process and agreed to preserve the embryos
according to their mutual plan to raise a family as a married couple. Id. In contrast, M.B.
alleged in his certification that before the couple began the IVF treatments, he and J.B.
had discussed the procedure's moral and ethical repercussions, especially in the context of
M.B.'s religious beliefs as a Catholic. Id. He further alleged that it was J.B.'s idea to
donate the embryos to infertile couples, as she had known about other individuals in her
workplace who were having difficulty conceiving. Id. at 710-11.
20. J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 613, 616 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000), affd in part and
modified in part, 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
21. Only a few state statutes have addressed the issue even indirectly. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 742.17 (West 1997) (stating that couples must execute a written agreement
providing for disposition of frozen embryos in the event of death, divorce, or other
unforeseen circumstances); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-9:133 (West 2000) (classifying
a pre-zygote as a "juridical person" that must not be intentionally destroyed or given up
for adoption); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 88 168-B:13 to 168-B:15,168-B:18 (2001) (requiring
couples to undergo medical exams and counseling and setting a fourteen-day limit for
maintenance of ex utero pre-zygotes).
22. See infra notes 53-104 and accompanying text.
23. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057-59 (Mass. 2000); J.B., 783 A.2d at 715-16;
Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600-01
(Tenn. 1992). See generally infra notes 27-41 and accompanying text (discussing the origin
and meaning of procreational autonomy).
24. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180; Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
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including the court deciding J.B. v. M.B.,25 essentially found contracts
to be the enemy.2 6

This Recent Development discusses America's interest in
procreational autonomy in light of fertility technology and analyzes
the disparate methods courts have developed to protect such
autonomy in the line of case law ending with J.B. v. M.B. It posits
that J.B. v. M.B. and prior decisions too quickly dispensed with the
contracts method of resolving disputes. By eliminating a test that is
most capable of protecting parties' rights to procreational autonomy,
these judicial oversights threaten those rights.
The right to procreational autonomy that cases deciding embryo
disposition disputes seek to advance derives from the United States

Constitution. "It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm
of personal liberty which the government may not enter. '27
According to the United States Supreme Court, the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause offers substantive protections of
rights beyond those enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 28 In this vein,
the right to privacy has been deemed a "constitutional right," despite
the fact that the right is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution.29 In
his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States," Justice Brandeis

defined this right of privacy as a right "against the government, the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men."'" The right to procreational autonomy
derives from this constitutional right to be left alone.

25. 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
26. See id. at 719; A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1057.
27. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992).
28. Id. at 847-49.
29. Despite the lack of precise language within the document itself, as early as 1891
the Supreme Court recognized that "a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain
areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152 (1973) (citing Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). Later, the
Court determined that a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy is a "liberty"
protected. against state interference by the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 152-53. This determination opened the
door to a liberal construction of this right by expressly rejecting the idea that such liberty
was substantively limited by the Bill of Rights or the specific state practices that existed at
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption. Casey, 505 U.S. at 834.
30. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
31. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The constitutional right to privacy extends to
two kinds of interests: " 'the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters' " and " 'the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions.' " See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir.
1980) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)). "The latter decisions have
encompassed 'matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
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Various opinions of the United States Supreme Court discuss the
right to be free from governmental interference with procreational
decisions.32 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,3 3 the Court struck down a
statute that authorized the sterilization of certain categories of
criminals. The Court described the right to procreate as "one of the
basic civil rights of man '34 and stated that "[m]arriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race." 35 Later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,36 the Court stated: "If the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child."37 Similarly, in Carey v. Population Services
International,38 the Court held that the decision whether or not to
beget or bear a child is "fundamental" to individual autonomy.39
Finally, the "reproductive freedom cases," including Roe v. Wade,4"
firmly established the principle that the Constitution places limits on
a State's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions about
family and parenthood. 1
relationships, and child rearing and education.' " Id. (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
713 (1976)).
32. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see also J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 715 (N.J. 2001) (citing Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
33. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
34. Id. at 541.
35. Id.
36. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
37. Id. at 453.
38. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
39. Id. at 685.
40. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
41. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 701-02 (extending constitutional protection to the sale and
distribution of contraceptives); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443 (holding that the same freedom
to use contraceptives was guaranteed to unmarried couples under the Equal Protection
Clause); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that the
Constitution does not permit a state to forbid a married couple to use contraceptives). But
see Heather A. Smith, A New Prescriptionfor Abortion, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1069, 107071 (2002) (describing how these limits may abate under political pressure). The scope of
such limits to states' ability to interfere with procreational decisions may significantly
narrow upon a change in the makeup of the Supreme Court. Id. at 1070. Three current
Supreme Court Justices-Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomashave already stated that they would overturn Roe v. Wade. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)). In addition, President Bush has recently taken actions to afford
more rights to developing fetuses, arguably in an effort to chip away at the holding of Roe
v. Wade. Id. at 1070-71. These actions include signing an executive order overturning the
Clinton administration's policy of giving federal funding to certain family planning groups
that offer abortion or abortion counseling, and more recently, declaring that a developing
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The State of New Jersey has assumed a similar stance with regard
to its own constitution. The privacy right of autonomy, although not
expressly mentioned, is "fairly implicit"42 in Article 1, Paragraph 1 of
the New Jersey State Constitution.43 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey has "found: 'The right of privacy ...extend[s] to a

variety of areas, including sexual conduct between consenting adults;
the right to sterilization; and even the right to terminate life itself.' ,4
In State v. Saunders,45 the New Jersey Supreme Court indicated that it

believed in a more expansive scope of protections offered by the
constitutional right of privacy than what was articulated in the United
States Supreme Court decision handed down in the same year,
finding that the right to privacy is not confined to "decisions whether
or not to beget or bear a child. ' 46 The court was even more explicit
when it established the standard for reviewing the state statute at
issue. Liberated from considerations of federalism, the court
demanded a stronger and more persuasive showing of public interest
than the Supreme Court would require before allowing the state to
forbid sexual conduct. 47 According to the court, the right of privacy

under New Jersey state law ensures citizens that the government's
ability to regulate private personal behavior is sharply limited.48

fetus should be entitled to government-funded health insurance under the Children's
Health Insurance Program. Id. The latter action represents the first time that a federal
program has defined childhood as beginning at conception. Id. at 1071. Such actions erect
plausible obstacles to persons asserting their rights to make decisions involving their
embryos without governmental interference.
42. Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11, 26 (N.J. 1992) (Pollock, J.,
concurring) (citing C. Willard Heckel, The Bill of Rights, in II CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1947 1336, 1339 (1951)); see State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333, 337 (N.J.
1977) (noting that both the United States and New Jersey Constitutions have been
construed to include the right to privacy); United Prop. Owners Ass'n of Belmar v.
Borough of Belmar, 777 A.2d 950, 970 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (holding that all
people have the right to privacy under Article I, Paragraph I of the New Jersey
Constitution).
43. "All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and
unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and
happiness." N.J. CONST. art. I, 1 1.
44. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 933 (N.J. 1982) (citations omitted).
45. 381 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1977).
46. Id. at 338 (citing Carey, 431 U.S. at 685). This interpretation is consistent with the
court's decision in In re Quinlan,355 A.2d 662 (N.J. 1976), in which it held that as a matter
of state constitutional law, the important right to privacy was broad enough to encompass
the freedom to make a personal choice as to the continuance of artificial life-support
mechanisms. See Saunders, 381 A.2d at 339.
47. Saunders,381 A.2d at 341.
48. Id. at 339.
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Federal and state cases thus emphasize not only the existence of
the right to procreational autonomy, but also its worthiness of
protection under the law. Because an embryo's value lies solely in its
potential to develop into a genetically related child, the right of
individuals to be left alone by the government with respect to their
decisions about the fate of their embryos falls within the scope of the
protected right to procreational autonomy.49
But the right to procreational autonomy encompasses two
distinct rights: the right to procreate and the right not to procreate. 0
When these rights are pitted against each other, which one should
prevail? Although the prevailing right in abortion cases would simply
be the one that the woman claims under the reasoning of Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,5 the existence of
IVF technology adds a new dimension to this problem. In this
dimension, the state and society's interests in protecting women's
bodily integrity prima facie are not affected to the same degree by the
decision awarding control of the embryos' fate to either of the
disputing parties as they are by the woman's decision whether to
abort her pregnancy. Courts therefore find themselves in uncharted
territory when they are charged with the duty to formulate a method
to protect parties' rights to procreational autonomy in frozen embryo
disputes.
The New Jersey Supreme Court thus was a pioneer of sorts, in
that it set out to prescribe the best method for protecting parties'
procreational autonomy in the context of frozen embryo disputes in
the absence of legislative guidance. J.B. wished to have the frozen
embryos destroyed after the divorce, while M.B. wanted to preserve
them for future implantation, either by another woman with whom he
might develop an intimate relationship or by another infertile couple.
Although the case was one of first impression in New Jersey, the
state's supreme court did have the benefit of the opinions of a few of
its sister states. Tennessee was the first jurisdiction to consider facts
similar to those of J.B. v. M.B. In Davis v. Davis," the fate of seven

49. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598 (Tenn. 1992).
50. Id. at 601.
51. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In holding that a provision that requires a wife to notify her
spouse before she may get an abortion was unconstitutional, the United States Supreme
Court recognized its prior holding that " '[i]nasmuch as it is the woman who physically
bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as
between [the husband and wife], the balance weighs in her favor.' " Id. at 896 (quoting
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976)).
52. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
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frozen embryos stored in a fertility clinic in Knoxville was at issue.53
During a "happier period in their relationship," a married couple
attempted to take advantage of the IVF procedure after the surgical
removal of both of the woman's fallopian tubes rendered her unable
to become pregnant naturally. 4 The couple's sixth attempt at
conception through IVF finally succeeded in producing viable
embryos, some of which were frozen, but the parties divorced before
more than one attempt at implantation could be performed.5 The
Davises disagreed as to who should control the embryos. At the time
of the case's hearing in the Tennessee Supreme Court, the wife
wanted the authority to donate the eggs to an infertile couple, while
the husband wanted them destroyed. 6
The couple had never entered into a contract that even feigned
to decide the disposition of the embryos in these circumstances.57
Because of the lack of an agreement, the court attempted to balance
the husband's right not to procreate against the wife's right to
procreate.58 The court considered the following factors: (1) the
husband's prior experiences with divorced parents and his resulting
concern for the psychological obstacles a child with divorced parents
may face; (2) the husband's "vehement opposition to fathering a child
that would not live with both parents;" and (3) the burden on the wife
of knowing that the lengthy IVF procedures she underwent were
futile. 9 The court decided that the husband's interest in avoiding
parenthood outweighed the wife's interest in donating the embryos. 61
Recognizing that the wife's emotional burden of knowing that the
IVF procedure was futile and that the genetic material that she
contributed would never become children was not "insubstantial," the
court nevertheless concluded that her interest in donation was not as
significant as the husband's interest in avoiding parenthood.61 If the
wife were allowed to donate the embryos, the husband "would face a
lifetime of either wondering about his parental status or knowing

53. Id. at 598.
54. Id. at 591.
55. Id. at 591-92.
56. Id. at 590. At the outset of the litigation, the wife wanted to have the embryos
implanted in her own uterus, but by the time the case reached the supreme court, she and
the husband had both remarried, and she had changed her position. Id. at 589-90.
57. Id. at 592.
58. Id. at 603-05.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 604.
61. Id.
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about his parental status but having no control over it."'6 2 Although
the court mentioned that the case would be closer if the wife were
seeking to use the embryos herself-but only if she could not achieve
parenthood by any other reasonable means-it did not attempt to
enumerate all the factors that should be considered in the balancingof-the-interests analysis.63 Nor did it attempt to prioritize the facts of
the case at issue that it used in its own analysis.'
Despite the absence of any agreement proposing to govern
control of the frozen embryos, the Davis court devoted a large
portion of its opinion to the discussion of the enforceability of such
contracts. 65 Ostensibly in accordance with the principle that both the
male and the female donors, having provided the gametic material
giving rise to the embryos, "retain decision-making authority as to
their disposition," the court concluded that dispositional contracts
should be enforced.66 The court's own initiative in professing its
affirmative opinion on the enforceability of contracts arguably
indicates its intention to encourage parties to enter into contracts.
Essentially, the court advertised to IVF patients, their partners, and
IVF clinics a notice that they could rely upon the enforceability of any
contracts they entered into proposing to control the disposition of
their frozen embryos. But although the court promoted contracts on
the basis that parties retain decision-making authority as gametedonors,67 and that this decision-making authority is dictated by the
existence of the right to procreational autonomy,68 it did not justify its
approval of contracts in terms of the positive and negative rights to
reproduce.
As indicated earlier, procreational autonomy
encompasses both a right to procreate and a right not to procreate.69
The Davis court expressly acknowledged the existence of these
distinct rights in the application of its balancing test,7" yet it did not
62. Id. In both the husband's and the court's views, donation of the embryos had the
potential of "rob[bing the husband] twice-his procreational autonomy would be defeated
and his relationship with his offspring would be prohibited." Id.
63. Id. at 604.
64. Id. at 603-04.
65. See id. at 597-98.
66. The court advocated the enforcement of such agreements in the event of divorce
as well as other contingencies, such as the death of one of the parties. Id. at 597.
67. Id. at 597.
68. Id. at 602.
69. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
70. Id. at 603 (noting that where the dispute over conflicting interests of constitutional
import is to be resolved by balancing the parties' interests, "the issue centers on the two
aspects of procreational autonomy-the right to procreate and the right to avoid
procreation").
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articulate how contracts furthered the rights, nor did it explain how
contracts offered protection superior to that offered by the secondary
balancing test. In fact, the Davis court's dictum, in attempting to
encourage contracts, actually muddled the distinction between the
two separate reproductive freedoms and thereby triggered the
contract method's ultimate demise.71
New York cemented Tennessee's dictum into its own law. In
Kass v. Kass,72 another married couple used IVF to overcome the
woman's inability to become pregnant due to her prenatal exposure
to diethylstilbestrol.7 3 No pregnancy resulted, and the couple decided
to divorce.74 Five embryos remained frozen.75 Unlike the couple in
Davis, the New York couple had entered into a detailed, seven-page
contract with the IVF clinic specifically providing that any extra
frozen embryos were to be donated to the IVF clinic for research
purposes in the event the parties could not agree as to their
disposition.76 The New York Court of Appeals, following Davis's
lead, held that such contracts should be presumed to be valid and
binding 77 without justifying its conclusion with a thorough analysis of
how each party's right to procreational autonomy would be
preserved. The court saw value in contracts' general ability to reduce
litigation costs, encourage parties to think thoroughly about the
possible contingencies of IVF and cryopreservation, and minimize
misunderstandings.7 1 The central question-how contracts affect
parties' procreational autonomy-was only answered summarily.
Contracts "maximize procreative liberty by reserving to the
71. See infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
72. 696 N.E.2d 174, 175 (N.Y. 1998).

73. Id.
74. Id. at 177.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 176-77. The Consent Form provided:
The possibility of our death or any other unforeseen circumstances that may
result in neither of us being able to determine the disposition of any stored
frozen pre-zygotes requires that we now indicate our wishes.
THESE
IMPORTANT DECISIONS

MUST BE DISCUSSED WITH

OUR IVF

PHYSICIAN AND OUR WISHES MUST BE STATED...

ON THE

ATTACHED ADDENDUM NO. 2-1, STATEMENT OF DISPOSTION.
THIS STATEMENT OF DISPOSITION MAY BE CHANGED ONLY BY
OUR SIGNING ANOTHER STATEMENT OF DISPOSITION WHICH IS
FILED WITH THE IVF PROGRAM.
Id. at 176. The Addendum indicated the couple's desire to release the embryos to the IVF

Program for biological research in the event of their disagreement. Id. at 176-77.
77. Id. at 180. In the opinion of the court, the enforcement of contracts would
encourage parties to think carefully through possible contingencies in advance. See id.
78. Id. The court also noted that this certainty was necessary for the effective
operation of IVF programs. Id.
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progenitors the authority to make... [the] personal, private decision"
of whether or not to procreate.7 9
Although the Tennessee and New York courts explicitly
endorsed contracts as the better method of dispute resolution,8" their
failure to analyze how contracts actually preserve procreational
autonomy undermines contracts' credibility as valuable protectors of
true autonomy. Nothing substantial was established in the case law to
refute the notions that refusal to honor contracts causes no real
injury. The failure to analyze how the positive right to reproduce is
compromised by not enforcing contracts was especially detrimental to
the contract method's continued existence.
The Massachusetts case of A.Z. v. B. Z.81 exhibited this
detrimental effect. As in Kass, a husband and wife entered into a
contract with an IVF clinic providing that if the spouses became
"separated," their frozen embryos were to be given to the wife for
implantation.82 Massachusetts's high court, however, found that the
contract did not manifest the husband's and wife's mutual consent to
a disposition scheme in the event that a disagreement arose between
them. 83 Rather, because of the wording and the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the document, the court found that the
agreement was merely enforceable between the IVF clinic and the
"donors" as a unit.'
More importantly, however, the court
proclaimed that even if the faults of execution and ambiguity within
the document could be cured, any contract that would compel an
individual to become a parent against his or her contemporaneous
objection is unenforceable.85 This conclusion rested on the court's
79. Id.
80. See supra notes 66 & 77 and accompanying text.
81. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
82. Id. at 1054.
83. Id. at 1056.
84. Id. at 1056-57. The court found that the primary purpose of the agreement was to
explain to the donors the benefits and risks of freezing the embryos and provide the clinic
with guidance for disposition of the embryos. Id. The court further reasoned that the lack
of a duration provision in the consent form precluded its enforcement because the court
would not assume that the donors intended the consent form to govern four years after it
was executed, especially in light of the fundamental change in their relationship. Id.
Although the court reasonably could have ended its analysis at this point, it went on to
note that the consent form used the term "should we become separated" without defining
"become separated." Id. at 1057. Because divorce legally ends a couple's marriage, the
court would not assume that the consent form's provision for "separation" was intended
by the parties to govern in the legally distinct instance of divorce. Id. This analysis seems
result-oriented because the parties, who were without legal counsel at the time of signing,
most likely were not made aware of the legal differences between divorce and separation.
85. Id. at 1057.
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finding that there existed a public policy against contracts to enter
into intimate familial relationships.8 6 The court reasoned that
enforcing dispositional contracts would be tantamount to using the
law as a mechanism for forcing parenthood and would invade an
individual's right to privacy.8" By equating the right to privacy with
the right not to reproduce, this court completely ignored the parallel
right to reproduce in its criticism of the contract method.8 8 This
analysis conflicts with the court's express recognition of the opposing
right in the balancing test that was ultimately applied, but completely
harmonizes with the analysis of contracts performed in Davis and
Kass. 9 In the absence of an enforceable contract in A.Z., the probate
court's decision to permanently enjoin the wife from "utilizing" the
frozen embryos, a decision that rested on the court's balancing of the
husband's right to avoid procreation against the wife's right to
procreate, 0 remained effective.9"
Thus, A.Z. v. B.Z. represents a pivotal point in the courts'
approach to custody disputes. The balancing-of-the-interests test was
proffered as the sole test to be applied in every instance of a custody
dispute over embryos. The court easily dispensed with the contract
analysis. With no rationale recognized in prior decisions linking
contracts to the preservation of the positive right to reproduce, the
court did not confront a counterargument to its public policy
justification for abolishing contracts in all circumstances.92

86. Id. at 1059.
87. Id. at 1057-58.
88. The court cited numerous instances in which agreements "that bind individuals to
future family relationships" have been held to be unenforceable. Id. at 1058-59 (citing
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 207, § 47A (Law Co-op. 1994) (abolishing a cause of action for the
breach of promise to marry); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 2 (Law Co-op. 1994)
(mandating that no mother may agree to surrender her child "sooner than the fourth
calendar day after the date of birth of the child to be adopted" regardless of any prior
agreement); R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 797 (Mass. 1998) (holding that a surrogacy

agreement in which the
unenforceable unless the
the mother could change
1986) (holding a contract

surrogate mother agreed to give up the child upon birth is
agreement contained a reasonable waiting period during which
her mind); Capazzoli v. Holzwasser, 490 N.E.2d 420, 421 (Mass.
requiring an individual to abandon a marriage is unenforceable);

Gleason v. Mann, 45 N.E.2d 280, 283-84 (Mass. 1942) (concluding that a woman's promise

never to marry unless she married a certain man was invalid as a general restraint on
marriage)). The court "glean[ed]" from these statutes and judicial decisions that prior
agreements to enter into familial relationships (marriage or parenthood) should not be
enforced against individuals who subsequently reconsider their decisions." Id. at 1059.
89. See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
90. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1055.

91. Id. at 1051.
92. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.

2003]

PROTECTING PROCREATIONAL AUTONOMY

891

Against this background of law and theory, the New Jersey
Supreme Court evaluated the facts of J.B v. M.B. Because the
language of the Cooper Center's consent form provided that in the
event of divorce the embryos would be relinquished to the clinic
"unless the court specifies who takes control and direction of the
tissues,"93 the court held that the form did not unambiguously
manifest the parties' intentions to control disposition in the event of
the parties' divorce.94 Instead, the parties merely agreed that on their
divorce the court would direct their decision of control and
disposition." In the absence of an agreement governing the dispute,
the court resorted to the default balancing-of-the-interests analysis.96
Understanding from Davis that a balancing-of-the-interests test
weighs the right to procreate against the right not to procreate,97 Chief
Justice Poritz announced the court's position that " 'ordinarily, the
party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail' "Is and awarded
custody to J.B.99
As in Davis, the court was not content to limit its decision to the
specific matter before it. 00 Instead, it set out to define the policy of
the state with regard to the enforceability of dispositional contracts in
general.
Noting various benefits of contracts that had been
recognized in previous decisions,10 1 such as the certainty they provide
IVF patients and clinics 02 and their ability to reduce litigation costs," 3

93. J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 613, 616 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (internal
quotations omitted) (emphasis added by the court), affid in part and modified in part, 783
A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
94. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 713-14 (N.J. 2001).
95. Id. at 714-15.
96. Id. at 716-17.
97. See id. at 716.
98. Id. (quoting Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992)).
99. Id. at 720.
100. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
101. J.B., 783 A.2d at 719 (citing Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 1998), and
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992), as pointing out persuasive reasons for
enforcing disposition agreements).
102. See id. at 719 (recognizing that contracts help guide parties undertaking IVF
procedures and fulfill the need for agreements between the participants and the clinics
performing the procedures). In Davis, the parties testified that although the clinic
personnel described the process of cryogenic preservation, "no one explained the ways in
which it would change the nature of IVF for them." Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592
(Tenn. 1992). As a result, "there was no discussion.., concerning disposition in the event
of a contingency such as divorce." Id. Enforcing contracts and thus encouraging their
execution would help to prevent such uninformed action on the part of the participating
spouses.
As the court in Kass summarized, contracts should "minimize
misunderstandings." Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998).
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the court found that these benefits were not outweighed by the
"public policy concerns that underlie limitations on contracts
involving family relationships."" ° The court contrived a hybrid rule:
agreements entered into at .the time IVF began are enforceable,
subject to the right of either party to change his or her mind about
disposition, provided that the clinic is notified of such change of mind
in writing at any time before the point of use or destruction of any
stored embryos. If either party changes his or her mind about

Contracts provide certainty for the IVF clinics as well. As the number of
cryogenically frozen embryos stored at these clinics continues to increase, see supra note
12, the demand for an efficient method to determine with certainty what to do with these
valuable bundles of cells becomes more pressing. Clearly drafted and reliably enforceable
contracts promote efficiency by enabling clinics to decide the fate of the preembryos
without court action. See, e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) (discussing
a couple who sued a clinic for not relinquishing their embryo upon their demand); Del Zio
v. Presbyterian Hosp. of N.Y., No. 74 Civ. 3855, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14450 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 14, 1978) (discussing a couple who brought a tortious conversion of personal
property claim and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against a
physician for destruction of a couple's frozen embryos).
103. J.B., 783 A.2d at 719. Parties who enter into enforceable contracts would benefit
from the lessened costs of litigation compared to those anticipated as a consequence of the
balancing-of-the-interests approach. Litigation would be limited to ordinary issues
surrounding the validity and ambiguity of an agreement executed between the parties
according to the maxims of contract law. As demonstrated in Davis and J.B., the
balancing-of-the-interests method requires the court to delve into matters such as the
parties' religious incentives, their ability and probability of future conception with or
without the use of the embryos, and their expected financial and emotional responses to a
particular custody decision. See id. at 716-17 (attempting to weigh the fact that the
husband already had a child and had capacity to father additional children, and the
potential physiological and emotional burdens on the wife that would result from possible
use or donation of embryos against the husband's desire to have a child using his wife's
egg, and the slight impairment of husband's potential to have more children that would be
caused by prohibiting him to use the frozen embryos); Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 (stating
that if the wife sought to use the preembryos herself, the court would have balanced the
husband's prior experiences with divorced parents and his resulting "vehement opposition
to fathering a child that would not live with both parents," against the practicability of
adoption for the wife and her capacity to conceive future children without the use of the
embryos). These subjective matters do not fit neatly into an objective analytical
framework and can increase the length, complexity, and cost of litigation.
104. J.B., 783 A.2d at 719. As in A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058-59 (Mass. 2000),
the court cited decisions and statutes that restricted contracts to enter into familial
relationships to exemplify the public policy against the enforcement of a contract
permitting implantation of embryos. See J.B., 783 A.2d at 717-18. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:23-1 (West 2000) (abolishing the cause of action for breach of contract to marry);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-46 (West 2000) (prescribing that private placement adoptions may
be approved over the objection of a parent only if that parent has failed or is unable to
perform "the regular and expected parental functions of care and support of the child");
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1245-46 (N.J. 1988) (prohibiting an agreement requiring a
surrogate to surrender her parental rights); Sees v. Baber, 377 A.2d 628, 636 (N.J. 1977)
(disfavoring private placement adoptions)).
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disposition before it is too late, the court would employ a balancingof-the-interests analysis of the parties' rights."' This melting-pot rule
proposes to offer certainty to parties because in the large majority of
cases the agreements will control. The rule also promises not to
increase litigation because when the balancing-of-the-interests
analysis is invoked, the party choosing not to become a biological
parent will almost certainly prevail." 6
For all practical purposes, though, this test will never result in the
enforcement of a contract that provides for the exercise of one
partner's positive right to reproduce against the objection of the other
partner. To unilaterally bar the other partner's right, the objecting
partner need only notify the clinic in writing sometime prior to the
instant at which the embryos will actually be implanted or donated.
J.B. therefore sharply limits the contracts approach to custody
disputes in New Jersey, to the point of extinguishing it altogether as
Massachusetts's high court did in A.Z. 107 The J.B. court did so
without considering whether failing to enforce a contract providing
for donation or implantation under any circumstances will ever
unnecessarily infringe on a person's positive right to procreation, a
right that the court expressly recognized as worthy of protection. 108
This Recent Development does not contend that the positive
right to reproduce is the better right. Instead, it criticizes the recent
failure of courts to address the implications of their decisions on both
of the rights at issue in custody disputes over frozen embryos, and the
consequential abolition of the contracts method of resolution without
satisfactory justification. In the context of reproductive rights,
positive rights should be distinguished from negative rights. 09 An
105. J.B., 783 A.2d at 719-20.
106. See id. at 719.
107. The method by which J.B. v. M.B. restricted contracts is problematic. Instead of
promoting certainty, this rule promotes deception. For example, a wife may consent to
allow her husband to retain control of extra embryos in the event of divorce at the time of
the IVF procedure, fully intending to secretly notify the clinic that she changed her mind
the next day, giving the husband a false sense of security that he can rely on his wife's legal
consent. This deception can be especially harmful if the husband agreed to follow through
with the procedure so long as he would always be guaranteed custody.
108. J.B., 783 A.2d at 719.
109. ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 3 (1995). Negative rights obligate others to

refrain from interfering with the rights bearer. Id. Positive rights impose an obligation on
others to act. Id. In the context of reproductive rights, some commentators contend that
these rights are parallel and symmetrical, while others, such as Christine Overall, contend
that the positive right to reproduce and the negative right not to reproduce are
asymmetrical: the positive right should be limited because its exercise affects other
persons' lives, but the right not to reproduce is an absolute right. Id. at 4-5.
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individual's positive right to reproduce affects several other people's
lives, potentially including those of the other genetic parent, 110 the
surrogate parent,"1 the nurturing or custodial parent, 2 and the
relatives of the individual exercising his positive right." 3 If the
positive right to reproduce is absolute, an individual may have the
right to be provided with every available means by which he or she
can potentially reproduce."' This could feasibly include the rights to
government funding for expensive reproductive services and free
access to surrogate mothers." 5 On the other hand, the exercise of an
individual's negative right to reproduce also has drastic consequences,

in that it may infringe upon other individuals' rights to bodily
integrity," 6 their own positive rights to reproductive freedom,"7 and
110. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992), recognized a husband's interest
in avoiding biological parenthood, noting that if the embryos that consisted of his genetic
material were donated against his will, he would suffer a lifetime of wondering about his
parental status or knowing about his parental status but having no control over it. Id.
Even though someone unknown to either party would gestate the embryos, the court
decided that this "technological fact" did not alter the fact that their genetic parenthood
would have a "profound impact" on their lives. Id. at 603.
111. A surrogate mother may suffer psychological damage from the act of surrogacy.
BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 109, at 119. Many women regret the decision to release
the child they bore to the sperm and egg donors. Id. Their families are torn by the
difficulty inherent in explaining the situation to the surrogate's own natural children. Id.
They are treated as mere "incubators" for genetic parents, and any action on their part to
develop a relationship with the child is met with severe conflict. Surrogacy is criticized for
commoditizing women, and the notion that a woman's body can be "rented" does a
disservice to women's efforts as a class to be valued for their intellectual capacities, and
not their reproductive capabilities. Id. at 118-19.
112. Exercising one's positive right to reproduce may render another legally or morally
responsible for supporting the resulting child. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5
(superseded 2000), 9B U.L.A. 407-08 (2001) (stating that husband's consent to the
artificial insemination of a woman with a donor's sperm will qualify the husband as the
"natural father" of the child for legal purposes).
113. See Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 265-66 (Mass. 2002)
(holding that, absent express legislative directive, posthumously conceived children are
not "automatically barred from taking under their deceased donor parent's intestate
estate").
114. BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 109, at 99.
115. See id.
116. See Christine Overall, Frozen Embryos and "Father's Rights": Parenthood and
Decision-Making in the Cryopreservation of Embryos, in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS AND
THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 178, 192 (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995) (arguing that
an infertile woman's bodily integrity is compromised if she is denied the right to use her
frozen embryos to reproduce, because she must undergo the entire IVF procedure again
to extract ova and attempt fertilization in order to reproduce, and that forcing the woman
to undergo IVF with another partner overlooks the painful, physically trying, and
emotionally and mentally taxing ordeals she endured to participate in the IVF program);
see also infra note 133 (discussing IVF procedures and how a woman's right to bodily
integrity affects cases involving disputes over such procedures).
117. See Overall, supra note 116, at 192.
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even their rights to be born.1 8 As reproduction is so basic to human
existence and so relevant to family structure,1 9 cases confronting
competing interests of reproductive freedom cannot dispense with a
thorough analysis of the repercussions of their decisions for both
rights contributing to reproduction: the right to reproduce and the
right not to reproduce.
Generally, where two ex-spouses dispute the fate of their
embryos, the enforcement of a contract can have two results for the
person againstwhom it is enforced: the contract may either force that
individual to potentially become a parent against his or her will, or
force him or her to forego the chance to reproduce.12 ° When couched
in terms of the effects of forcing a person to do something against that
person's will, these contracts might give the impression that they will
infringe upon individuals' procreational autonomy. A deeper analysis
of the contracts, however, reveals that they can preserve individuals'
fundamental rights.
Enforcement of a contract awarding a wife custody of embryos
where the husband does not want to become a father arguably does
not violate the husband's right not to procreate. A husband has
already decided to reproduce at the time he entered into the
contract. 2'
He has voluntarily released his sperm and had it
transferred into a petri dish with a woman's egg cells. 122 If his right
not to procreate means he is allowed to control the destiny of his
sperm after release, the right would conflict with the well-accepted
notion that a donor at a sperm bank cannot reclaim his semen after it
has been used by a recipient couple. 23 The husband cannot now
claim that he will suffer injury from the knowledge that he is a
biological parent. Voluntarily agreeing to conjoin his sperm with
another's egg estops him from complaining about the psychological
burden of his decision.2 4 Further, the husband cannot claim that he
will be injured by the parental responsibilities that might materialize
118. According to some views, the embryo represents a semi-person that has a right to
be protected because it might be born after transfer. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,
596 (Tenn. 1992).
119. BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 109, at 7-8.
120. Both of these results are mere "chances" as the present state of reproductive
technology does not yet guarantee the successful birth of a child. But such lack of
certainty in the outcomes should not extensively diminish the significance of either
contract, as the success rates of reproductive technologies currently present very viable
chances and continue to advance rapidly.
121. See Overall, supra note 116, at 182-83.
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. But see supra note 110.
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if the wife gets custody.125 If the agreement manifests the parties'
intentions to allow the wife to donate the embryos, then the husband
will have no such parental responsibilities.12 6 His parental identity
will be anonymous, and he will have no rearing obligations.'27 If the
agreement allows the wife to implant the embryos herself, then it is
possible that the husband will have legal obligations to provide
support for the child that was conceived during marriage.12 s The
state's interest in protecting the resulting child, however, outweighs
any violation of his right not to reproduce.
Similarly, a contract awarding a husband custody where the wife
does not want to become a parent does not violate the wife's right not
to reproduce. The wife, by willingly enduring the IVF procedures
and consenting to the union of her egg with her husband's sperm, is
estopped from complaining about the burdens of genetic parenthood.
The legal implications of parenthood would not be an issue if the
contract called for donation of the embryos, and if she does incur
legal obligations attached to parenthood, these are not taxes on her
procreational freedom. These implications are instead society's
insurance for the children's interest and represent fully ascertainable
risks mutually assumed by the parents who agreed to prolong the
embryos' viability past the point of the couple's divorce.'2 9

125. See Overall, supra note 116, at 182-83.
126. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (superseded 2000), 9B U.L.A. 407-08 (2001).
127. C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 824 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. 1977) ("By donating his
semen anonymously, the donor impliedly gives it without taking on [the responsibilities of
fatherhood]."); see UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001) ("[D]onors

are eliminated from the parental equation."); Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure
Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the FunctionalApproach to Parentage,53 HASTINGS
L.J. 597, 631 (2002) (explaining that, for the purposes of the new UPA model legislation,
anonymous sperm donors are presumed to have no interest in the rights and obligations of
paternity).
128. Courts have typically dealt with questions of parental rights and responsibilities
where assisted reproduction technologies are involved using traditional family law
concepts. See Marsha Garrison, The Technological Family: What's New and What's Not,
33 FAM. L.Q. 691, 697 (1999). In cases involving artificial insemination with donor sperm
("AID"), where the husband who sought to avoid child support obligations would
challenge his paternity, courts have treated the AID child like natural children in the same
circumstances-they have relied on the equitable doctrines of laches and estoppel to hold
that a mother's husband was the child's legal father. Id. Courts that held that such a child
was illegitimate still imposed support obligations. Id. (citing Gursky v. Gursky, 242
N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963) (holding that child was illegitimate but husband was still
liable for child's support based on his consent to AID)).
129. Women's rights to procreational autonomy should not extend further than men's
in this context, even though women may delay their right to choose to become a parent in
the abortion context. Roe v. Wade and its progeny protect a woman's right to privacy
during gestation of a fetus, see supra note 51, but this protection is justified by the
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On the other side of the spectrum are contracts that force an
individual to forego a chance at reproduction. In completely avoiding
analysis of the separate rights at stake, the courts failed to recognize
that these contracts may have significantly different effects on a
party's right to reproductive freedom depending on whether that
party is male or female. A contract awarding a wife custody of
embryos where the husband wants to become a father imposes a very
minimal restraint on the husband's right to reproduce. If the husband
is still fertile, he can accomplish reproduction through natural means
by finding another partner. If he has sub-normal fertility, he can
again seek assistance including ICS1130 at a fertility clinic. Such a
remedy imposes on him an arguably minimal physical burden of
masturbation for the production of a semen sample. A man who was
fertile at the time the embryos were created but has subsequently lost
his fertility may not be able to accomplish genetic parenthood. In this
instance, enforcement of the contract would appear to infringe upon
the husband's right to reproduce. But the alternative would be a
much greater injustice. A court, by awarding custody to the husband
in this instance, would contravene a contract to which the husband
expressly agreed, disregard the woman's right to not reproduce, and
encourage surrogacy, 3 ' because the man would still need another
woman's consent to implant unrelated embryos into her uterus to
accomplish the pregnancy.'32 These consequences should not be
endured when the man who entered into the contract exercised his
freedom to contract by imposing a limitation on the potential of his
own embryos to become his future genetically related children.
On the other hand, the enforceability of a contract awarding the
custody of the embryos to the husband is more dubious where the
wife wants to become a mother. If the wife were the fertile partner in
the relationship and remains fertile at the time the custody decision is
made, she can resort to natural means for procreation, and thus, like
the man in the same circumstances, only sacrifices the chance to
reproduce with a particularperson. Conversely, where the wife is
woman's right to preserve her bodily integrity, a right that is not at issue when her decision
to release her gametes has resulted in an embryo that is outside of her body.
130. See supra note 7.
131. For an abbreviated explanation of the negative consequences attributable to
surrogacy, see supra note 111.
132. In addition, because the embryos' viability is limited, LYNDA BECK FENWICK,
PRIVATE CHOICES, PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES:

REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND THE

ETHICS OF CONCEPTION, PREGNANCY, AND FAMILY 191 (1998) (estimating the viability

of cryopreserved embryos to be between two and ten years), no opportunity may exist for
most men to find a truly altruistic surrogate mother.
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infertile, her right to become a parent is much more restricted by the
contract's enforcement than where the parties' roles are reversed.
Her bodily integrity is severely compromised. Unlike the man whose
physical burden in being forced to undergo IVF and ICSI again with a
new partner amounts to an act of masturbation, the woman must
undergo extensive hormonal stimulation and a surgical procedure to
extract her ova.'33 The cost and physical burdens that such remedies
present presumably will erect practical barriers to many women's
exercise of their rights to reproduce.
As a final permutation in the analysis, a contract proposing to
force a woman to implant embryos in her own uterus against her will
should never be enforced. The woman has "an absolute right to seek
termination of any resulting pregnancy, at least within the first
trimester,14 [therefore,] ordering her to undergo a uterine transfer
would be a futility."' 35 Further, requiring her to undergo the physical
procedure necessary for implantation and impliedly requiring her to
carry the embryos to term would flout her right to privacy and
autonomy.'36
Human ingenuity once again has planted the roots that support
an entirely new area of jurisprudence. IVF facilitates the creation of
new life-and new rights. What shield will the courts use to protect
those rights implicated in custody disputes over frozen embryos? We
as citizens can only hope that they will choose carefully. Contracts
may be the most effective legal device to guard against
unconstitutional violations of citizens' cherished rights to
procreational autonomy, but recent courts have cast this device aside
without examining it closely enough to measure its true value. The
133. See MENIRU, supra note 4, at 118-19 (noting that among other physical burdens
involved in the IVF procedure, women patients must endure several hormonal injections,
ultrasound scanning procedures, blood tests, a period of fasting, and a surgical procedure
to retrieve their egg cells, while their male partners' physical involvement is generally
limited to the production of a semen sample, which does not have to be generated on
demand at the clinic). In Davis, for example, Mary Sue Davis underwent a total of six
months of subcutaneous injections necessary to shut down her pituitary gland, forty-eight
days of intermuscular injections necessary to stimulate her ovaries, and five
anesthetizations to carry out the couple's six attempts at IVF. See Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W.2d 588, 591-92 (Tenn. 1992). Despite the existence of these "hard facts," the court
expressly concluded that even though "it is fair to say that women contribute more to the
IVF process than men," none of the concerns about a woman's bodily integrity that have
previously precluded men from controlling abortion decisions are applicable. Id. at 601.
134. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596 n.21.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 597 n.20 (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 71 (1976) (invalidating the requirement that a woman have the written consent of her
spouse as a prerequisite to abortion)).
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first courts that confronted the issue promoted contracts to protect
citizens' rights to procreational autonomy, but used the wrong logical
beams to support their stance. Specifically, Davis and Kass missed
the mark in saying that contracts advance procreational autonomy in
that they protect the right of parties to be left alone by the
government with their private decisions,13 7 and protect their right to
retain decision-making authority with respect to their embryos.'38 In
the context of custody disputes over frozen embryos, their respective
rights are pitted against each other. Any support for a method of
protecting the right to procreational autonomy must be couched in
terms of the separate and opposing rights-the right to procreate and
the right not to procreate. The blurring of these two rights by Davis
and Kass undermines the support for the very method they promoted.
Society's vital interest in human reproduction demands reevaluation
of contracts as the shield of choice.
AMANDA J. SMITH

137. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998) (noting that contracts
"maximize procreative liberty by reserving to the progenitors the authority to make ...
[the] personal, private decision" of whether or not to procreate); Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602
(stating that procreational autonomy "dictates that decisional authority rests in the
gamete-providers alone," and "no other person or entity has an interest sufficient to
permit interference with the gamete-providers' decision").
138. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597 (stating that enforcing contracts is "in keeping with
the proposition that the progenitors ... retain decision-making authority" as to the
disposition of their embryos); see also text accompanying supra notes 66-68 (discussing
courts willingness to enforce contracts on the basis of parties' retention of decision-making
authority as gamete-donors).
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